Inferring Attribute Non-attendance from Discrete Choice Experiments: Implications for Benefit Transfer by Glenk, K. et al.
 Document downloaded from: 
 
This paper must be cited as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final publication is available at 
 
 
Copyright 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9777-9
http://hdl.handle.net/10251/50785
Springer Verlag (Germany)
Glenk, K.; Martin-Ortega, J.; Pulido-Velazquez, M.; Potts, J. (2014). Inferring Attribute Non-
attendance from Discrete Choice Experiments: Implications for Benefit Transfer.
Environmental and Resource Economics. 60(4):497-520. doi:10.1007/s10640-014-9777-9.
1 
 
Inferring attribute non-attendance from discrete choice experiments: 
implications for benefit transfer  
Klaus Glenk · Julia Martin-Ortega · Manuel Pulido-Velazquez · Jacqueline Potts 
 
Abstract 
Typical convergent validity tests of benefit transfer based on stated preference data assume that 
willingness to pay (WTP) estimates have been accurately measured, and that differences in WTP arise 
from differences in observable and unobservable characteristics between the study  and the policy 
sites. In this paper, we conduct a convergent validity test assuming equality of underlying preferences, 
but allow for the possibility that transfer errors arise from differences in the way that respondents 
process information in the preference elicitation tasks. Using data from an identical survey instrument 
applied to the population of two river basins in Spain, we obtain marginal and total WTP estimates for 
ecological improvements of water bodies and the corresponding transfer errors across sites. Results of 
equality constraint latent class (ECLC) models that infer attribute non-attendance (AN-A) are 
compared to results from mixed logit (MXL) models in WTP space. We found large absolute and 
relative differences in marginal and total WTP between sites for the MXL models, and significantly 
reduced transfer errors for the ECLC model. This paper therefore provides further evidence that AN-
A can significantly affect environmental values derived from attribute-based stated preference 
methods and is the first to investigate the implications for benefit transfer. 
 
 
Keywords: attribute non-attendance, benefit function transfer; convergent validity; discrete choice 
modelling;; Water Framework Directive 
 
1. Introduction 
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The discrete choice experiment (DCE) literature on attribute non-attendance (hereafter AN-A) 
describes a phenomenon where each respondent may focus only on a particular subset of attributes 
while making his or her choices. Such behaviour is in conflict with the assumption of fully 
compensatory preferences typically made when using modelling stated choice data. Fully 
compensatory behaviour implies that respondents with complete knowledge of all the information 
presented in the choice task make trade-offs between all attributes and their levels when choosing the 
preferred alternative. However, a growing body of literature has demonstrated that it is quite common 
for respondents to ignore one or several attributes when making their choices (Hensher et al. 2005, 
2012; Scarpa et al. 2009; Campbell et al. 2011). 
AN-A behaviour can have a variety of underlying reasons including, for example, irrelevance of an 
attribute to a particular choice situation or coping strategies to reduce the complexity of the choice 
task and hence the cognitive cost associated with choosing (Alemu et al. 2013). Irrespective of the 
particular source of AN-A behaviour, the violation of the continuity axiom associated with AN-A 
rules out the possibility of estimating marginal rates of substitution between certain attributes, 
including implicit prices, at the level of the individual respondent (Scarpa et al. 2009). At the sample 
level, not accounting for AN-A can result in biased estimates of preference parameters and 
willingness to pay (WTP), with potentially serious implications on the further use of WTP estimates 
in policy analysis. While a substantial body of literature exists on the incidence of AN-A in DCEs and 
the resulting consequences for the estimation of marginal WTP (MWTP) and welfare measures 
(Hensher et al. 2005; Puckett and Hensher 2008; Campbell et al. 2008; Scarpa et al. 2009; Hensher 
and Greene 2010; Scarpa et al. 2010; Kragt 2013; Scarpa et al. 2013), the implications of AN-A have 
not yet been investigated in the context of DCE applications to benefit transfer.  
The benefit transfer method, which estimates the value of a change of an environmental good at a 
target ‘policy’ site using information from a study conducted at another ‘study’ site, appeals to policy 
makers because of its great potential to reduce costs and time needed for the estimation of non-market 
values (Navrud and Ready, 2007). Policy makers’ demand for ‘quick and cheap’ approaches to 
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deriving non-market values for policy analysis has been mirrored by an increasing body of literature 
on the benefit transfer method in general (Wilson and Hoehn 2006; Bateman et al. 2011; Kaul et al. 
2013) and on applications using DCEs in particular (Morrison and Bennett 2004; Hanley et al. 2006; 
Colombo et al. 2007; Johnston and Duke 2009, 2010; Baskaran et al. 2010; Martin-Ortega et al. 
2012). Despite significant research progress in recent years, it is still being debated how to increase 
the accuracy and reliability of benefit transfer, and which guiding criteria should be applied to 
generate an acceptable level of transfer errors (Bateman et al. 2011; Martin-Ortega et al. 2012; Kaul et 
al. 2013). 
Most of the research efforts to improve the reliability of the benefit transfer method thus far aim to 
mitigate the generalisation error which arises from differences between the study and the policy sites 
that are expected to relate to the differences in the parameter values of the utility functions 
(Rosenberger and Stanley 2006). In contrast, measurement error1 is the error endogenous to the 
research process that can potentially affect the accurate measurement of MWTP and welfare estimates 
for use in benefit transfer. Empirical assessments of theoretical models require analyst judgment on 
preference elicitation methods and data analysis (Hanemann 2000), and measurement error occurs if 
decisions on the approach to empirical analysis made by analysts affect the transferability of values. 
Some of this error is inevitably ‘passed on’ from original value estimation and may even be amplified 
by benefit transfer if care is not taken to minimize such effects (Wilson and Hoehn 2006). 
Measurement error has received comparatively less attention in the benefit transfer literature2. So far, 
measurement error in benefit transfer related to methodological factors has largely been dealt with in 
meta-analysis-based benefit transfer (e.g., Johnston et al. 2006; Moeltner et al. 2007), but less so in 
                                                            
1 For completeness, we note that Rosenberg and Stanley (2006) identify a third category of transfer error, the 
publication bias arising from economic journals giving more attention to methodological innovations than to 
reporting ‘conventional’ valuation studies. 
2 Both generalisation and measurement error can be confounded. Certain types of measurement error related to, 
for example, design principles for the development of valuation scenarios are implicitly addressed when aiming 
at reducing the generalisation error (Bateman et al. 2011).  
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value and function transfers. This paper is specifically concerned with measurement error arising from 
the choice of the econometric specification used for analysis, which may be denotes as econometric 
specification error. An example investigating the implications of econometric specification error is 
Colombo et al. (2007), who find that model choice matters in a function transfer context and conclude 
that the inclusion of preference heterogeneity reduces the magnitude of transfer errors. 
In much of the benefit transfer research based on stated preference data, tests of convergent validity, 
(testing for WTP differences between study site estimates and ‘actual’ values at a policy site and 
observing the magnitude of ‘transfer errors’) have certainly been the main methodological tool to 
assess the validity of the transfer (Boyle et al. 2010; Kaul et al. 2013). These tests rest on the 
assumption that both study site and policy site WTP estimates have been accurately measured; or that 
at least any measurement errors, including those related to the econometric specification, are 
systematically affecting both study and policy site data (Boyle et al. 2010). Hence, any WTP 
differences between sites are assumed to arise from observable and unobservable differences in site 
characteristics. In this paper, we conduct a convergent validity test assuming equality of underlying 
preferences, but allow for the possibility that transfer errors arise from differences in the way 
respondents processed information in the preference elicitation tasks. In particular, we conduct a 
function transfer testing for differences in MWTP and compensating surplus (CS) between study site 
and policy site after adjusting for differences in observable socio-economic characteristics and 
additionally account for AN-A behaviour that may be present and differ between sites   
Differences in AN-A behaviour can be a result of the research process (for example, due to 
differences in survey administration and enumerators), reflecting hitherto unobserved differences 
between study and policy site (for example, it may reflect cultural differences between two sites that 
impact on response behaviour in surveys), or both. Whatever the source of differences in AN-A 
behaviour, if the study site respondents exhibit selective attribute attendance, estimated WTP values 
of the study site might be biased and transferred to the policy site. If AN-A behaviour differs between 
study and policy sites, there is a risk that conclusions drawn from tests of convergent validity are 
flawed. Scarpa et al. (2009) suggest that researchers involved in previous DCE studies might want to 
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explore whether the conclusions drawn from previous data analysis are robust when AN-A is 
accounted for. This question may as well be extended to the analysis of DCE data for use in benefit 
transfer.  
Therefore, the aims of this paper are to i) investigate whether transfer errors in benefit transfer of non-
market values can (at least partially) be attributed to AN-A behaviour; and ii) to analyse the potential 
of accounting for AN-A behaviour in choice models to reduce transfer error. To the best of our 
knowledge, these questions have not yet been explored in the literature. In order to do so, we use data 
from an identical choice experiment questionnaire that had been previously applied to two sites. We 
estimate and compare MWTP indicators, CS and transfer errors using results of mixed logit (MXL) 
models in WTP space and equality constrained latent class (ECLC) models that explicitly take AN-A 
into account.  
The DCE data used in this paper was collected in the policy context of the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), which prescribes the improvement of water bodies across Europe to ‘good 
ecological status’. The non-market benefits of ecological improvements in water bodies can be used 
for an assessment of economic efficiency and disproportionality  in the implementation of the WFD 
(Brouwer 2008; Vinten et al. 2012). The use of benefit transfer is of particular interest in this context, 
due to the need of estimating environmental benefits of water status improvements across Europe on 
different spatial scales in a limited amount of time, for which it is unrealistic to expect the use of 
primary valuation studies only.  
 
2. Method 
 
To test the effects of considering AN-A behaviour when estimating benefit transfer errors, we use 
data collected from DCEs in two Spanish river basins: the Guadalquivir River Basin (GRB) in the 
South of Spain, and the Serpis River Basin (SRB) in the East of the country; where main problems in 
complying with the WFD relate to water scarcity. Valuation scenarios were characterized by different 
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levels of the river’s water flow causing varying degrees of deviation from natural ecological 
conditions with respect to species diversity and habitat conditions (ENV); different frequencies of 
household water restrictions (RES); and a cost operationalised as an increase in the annual water bill 
(COST).  
The choice models that do not incorporate AN-A behaviour are estimated in WTP space following 
Train and Weeks (2005) and Scarpa et al. (2008). The modelling approach is based on random utility 
theory, with a utility function U for respondent n and alternative i in choice task t characterised by 
price p (COST) and non-price attributes x (ENV, RES) of the experimental design, and a random 
error term ε: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡  =   −𝛼𝑛 𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝜷𝑛
′𝒙𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑛𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where α and β are parameters to be estimated and ε is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed (iid) and related to the choice probability with a Gumbel distribution with respondent 
specific error variance Var(εni) = μn
2(π2/6), with μn being a respondent specific scale factor.  
Train and Weeks (2005) show that equation (1) can be divided by μn to derive a scale-free and 
behaviourally equivalent utility function with a new error term that is constant across individuals: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡  =  −(𝛼𝑛/𝜇𝑛)𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + (𝜷𝑛/𝜇𝑛)′𝒙𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑛𝑖𝑡     (2) 
where εnit is iid with constant error variance π
2/6. Substituting γn = αn/μn and cn = βn/μn  in equation (2) 
as the parameters to be estimated provides what Train and Weeks (2005) refer to as the model in 
preference space. Exploiting the fact that MWTP is wn = cn/γn, the utility function in WTP space can 
be written as: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡  =  −𝛾𝑛𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + (𝛾𝑛𝒘𝑛)′𝒙𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑛𝑖𝑡.    (3) 
Denote the sequence of choices over Tn choice tasks for respondent n as yn, i.e. yn = 〈𝑖𝑛1, 𝑖𝑛2, … , 𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑛〉. 
In a mixed logit (MXL) model, heterogeneity across respondents is introduced by allowing γn and wn 
to deviate from the population means following a random distribution. Conveniently, as opposed to 
models in preference space, the distribution of MWTP can be estimated directly. In a MXL model, the 
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unconditional or mixed logit choice probability of respondent n’s sequence of choices is the integral 
of the logit formula over all possible values of γn and wn: 
Pr(𝒚𝑛|𝛾𝑛, 𝒘𝑛) =  ∫ ∏
exp (−𝛾𝑛𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + (𝛾𝑛𝒘𝑛)′𝒙𝑛𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp (−𝛾𝑛𝑝𝑛𝑗𝑡 + (𝛾𝑛𝒘𝑛)′𝒙𝑛𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑓(𝜼𝑖|𝜴)𝑑𝜼𝑖
𝑇𝑛
𝑡1=1
                    (4) 
where f(ni|Ω) is the joint density of the parameter vector for price and K non-price attributes [γn, wn1, 
wn2, … , wnK], ηi is the vector comprised of the random parameters and Ω denotes the parameters of 
these distributions (e.g. the mean and variance). This integral does not have a closed form and thus 
requires approximation through simulation (Train, 2003), in our case using 2,000 Halton draws. The 
price attribute parameter is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution, the MWTP parameters of the 
non-price attributes are assumed to follow a normal distribution, and the MWTP parameter for an 
alternative specific constant (ASC) associated with the status quo is fixed (i.e. non-random). Socio-
economic characteristics and perceptual variables related to respondents’ attitudes and beliefs 
regarding water scarcity and its impact are included as interactions with non-price attributes and the 
ASC. Conveniently, these interactions directly capture effects of individual-specific characteristics on 
MWTP. The resulting parameter estimates are used as a transfer function that adjusts MWTP to 
observed characteristics at the policy site. The MXL model has been used in several recent benefit 
transfer convergent validity tests based on DCEs (Hanley et al. 2006; Colombo et al. 2007; Johnston 
and Duke 2009, 2010; Baskaran et al. 2010). To our knowledge, this is the first application of MXL 
models in WTP space in a benefit function transfer context. 
To incorporate AN-A behaviour into the estimation of preferences from stated choice data, we use the 
equality constrained latent class model (ECLC) proposed by Scarpa et al. (2009) and applied in 
several other recent studies (e.g., Campbell et al. 2011; Hensher and Greene 2010; Hensher et al. 
2012). Instead of using latent classes to represent a discrete mixture of people’s preferences, the 
ECLC models heterogeneity in attribute processing strategies,  in our case AN-A behaviour. Each 
latent class in the ECLC model represents a different pattern of attribute attendance. The probability 
of respondent n choosing alternative i, conditional on belonging to class c out of K classes reflecting a 
certain AN-A pattern, can be written as: 
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𝑃𝑛(𝑖|𝑐) =   
exp (𝜷𝑐
′ 𝒙𝑖)
∑ exp (𝜷𝑐
′ 𝒙𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 ; 𝑐 ∈ {1 … 𝐾}.      (5) 
The unconditional probability is then given by: 
𝑃𝑛(𝑖) =  ∑
exp c
∑ exp 𝑘
K
k=1
𝐾
𝑐=1  
exp (𝜷𝑐
′ 𝒙𝑖)
∑ exp (𝜷𝑐
′ 𝒙𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 ;    ∑ 𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 = 0.   (6) 
where  is a set of K class-specific constants identified by ensuring that they sum to zero. The model 
allows for fully compensatory preferences where all attributes are considered; any combination of 
ignoring one or more attributes; and non-attendance to all attributes in the choice set, reflecting 
random choice between alternatives (Scarpa et al. 2009). These AN-A patterns are accommodated by 
imposing restrictions on the utility coefficients in each latent class. A zero utility weight is assigned to 
attribute coefficients that are not considered, while all coefficients to be estimated are constrained to 
be equal across classes. That is, preferences are assumed to be homogeneous across the sample, as in 
CL models. There is a maximum of 2k permutations of AN-A, and hence, latent classes in the model, 
where k is the number of attributes that are either considered or ignored by a respondent. A key 
outcome of the ECLC model are the class probabilities for the 2k AN-A patterns, which can be used to 
infer the probability that an attribute has been ignored.  
While it is implicit that the parameters are constrained to be equal across classes in the ECLC, it is 
less obvious if this should also apply to ASCs. Previous literature applying the ECLC is mostly silent 
about the treatment of ASCs, although it can impact on results. An exception is Hensher et al. (2012), 
which estimates ASCs for the one class where all attributes are attended to, but omit constants 
(constraining ASC coefficients to zero) for all other classes where one or more attribute coefficients 
are assigned zero values. In environmental DCM applications, an ASC is usually added to capture 
differences in utility between the status quo alternative (or an ‘opt-out’ alternative) and the other 
choice options. It may be possible to assign a behavioural interpretation to the status quo option, for 
example related to protest attitudes (Meyerhoff and Liebe 2009), if the attribute levels used to 
describe the status quo also appear in the designed part of the choice experiment. If this is not the 
case, however, it is not possible to estimate the difference in utility between the baseline level of the 
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attributes (used in the status quo option) and the reference level (the lowest level appearing in the 
designed part of the choice experiment). In this situation, the ASC parameter captures the differences 
in utility between the baseline level and the reference levels for all the attributes, together with any 
utility from choosing the status quo that is unrelated to attribute information. In an ECLC context, this 
means that it is counterintuitive to constrain the ASC to be equal across classes, as non-attendance to 
one or more of the attributes will almost certainly influence the ASC parameter. Constraining the 
ASC to be equal hence imposes unnecessary restrictions and may bias inferred AN-A patterns, 
preference estimates and MWTP estimates. Therefore, we do not impose ASC equality across classes 
in our case.  
Moreover, there may be a class of respondents who regard the options in the designed part of a choice 
experiment as broadly similar, since all involve some environmental improvement along with an 
increase in cost, whereas the status quo option involves no environmental improvement and no extra 
cost. Such respondents may make a choice between the status quo and the other options, but choose 
one of the other two options at random, giving rise to a non-zero ASC but zero coefficients for the 
other attributes. Therefore, we additionally include a class where all attribute coefficients and the 
ASC are constrained to be zero, to reflect completely random choice among alternatives. In sum, we 
consequently estimate 2k+1 classes, 2k classes for all permutations of AN-A patterns without 
constraining the ASC to be equal across classes, and an additional one that reflects random choice 
among all the alternatives, totalling to 9 classes in the case study application reported in this paper. 
To enable a transfer function, socio-economic characteristics and perceptual variables are included as 
interactions with the ASC and the attributes. Note that the interaction terms only enter the utility 
function in classes where the associated attributes are attended to, and that the parameters of the 
interaction terms are constrained to be equal across those classes. Interactions with the ASC follow 
the same pattern.  
To analyse the impacts of considering AN-A behaviour in benefit transfer, MWTP estimates based on 
MXL model results using data from GRB and SRB serve as reference models for comparison to 
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ECLC estimates. MWTP estimates based on MXL models are calculated as unconditional mean 
parameter estimates. 
MWTP calculation from ECLC models requires assumptions to be made about respondents with a 
high probability of non-attendance to cost. We calculate the weighted average WTP over those classes 
where cost is attended to, assuming that WTP is zero for those classes where cost is attended to but 
the attribute is not attended to, with the probability of class membership conditional on cost being 
attended to as weights. This is a compromise between two approaches that have recently been applied 
in the literature. Campbell et al. (2011) calculate the weighted average MWTP over those classes 
where both the attribute and cost are attended to, where the weights are the probability of class 
membership conditional on both the attribute and cost being attended to. Kragt (2013) suggests that an 
alternative approach is to assume that MWTP is zero for those respondents who do not make full 
trade-offs3.  
Calculating WTP from ECLC models generally implies accepting that a proportion of respondents is 
not sensitive to changes in the cost attribute (and hence income), which it is at odds with economic 
theory, and is ‘probably not a realistic representation of [peoples’] preferences with respect to money’ 
(Scarpa et al. 2009, 166). Hence, the inferred ‘non-attendance’ to changes in cost may be due to the 
fact that people care for money, but behaved in the choice experiment as if their marginal utility was 
(close) to zero. As investigated by Puckett and Hensher (2008), and emphasised by Hensher et al. 
(2012), it may also be due to the fact that some respondents may not perceive the between-alternative 
difference in cost large enough to influence their choice – at least for a subset of the choice tasks. This 
would suggest that the inability to measure marginal utility of income in every case is related to the 
experimental design, which induces the – from an analyst’s perspective – undesirable behaviour of not 
trading cost when choosing among alternatives. When observing impacts of AN-A on the value of 
travel time savings (VTTS) using an ECLC model, Hensher et al. (2012, 243) are ‘inclined to support 
the mean VTTS [derived from classes] where we can observe a time-cost trade-off’, arguing that 
                                                            
3 We calculated MWTP based on the approaches applied in Campbell et al. (2011) and Kragt (2013). Results 
differed slightly in magnitude but not qualitatively to the MWTP estimates reported in this paper. 
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applying this value to the whole sample is appealing from the perspective of behavioural 
interpretation. 
Alternatively, inferred ‘non-attendance’ to changes in cost may reflect an inability to capture a non-
zero marginal utility of income using the ECLC. This could be due to not accounting for preference 
heterogeneity with respect to cost, resulting in the ECLC erroneously assigning probabilities for zero 
marginal utility of income when in fact it is merely very low (Campbell et al. 2012; Hess et al. 2013). 
Some of those respondents who are identified as having a high probability of not attending to cost 
may actually have a very high MWTP for all attributes. Because it is not possible within the usual 
model framework to assess whether this is actually the case, it seems preferable to assume that their 
MWTP is similar to that of those respondents who do attend to cost rather than that it is zero.  
Compensating surplus (CS) is calculated for the six improvement options with respect to water use 
restrictions (RES) and river water flows (ENV) following Hanemann (1984) as: 
𝐶𝑆 =  −
1
𝛼
 [𝑙𝑛 ∑ exp 𝑉1 − 𝑙𝑛 ∑ exp 𝑉0 ]     (7) 
where CS is the compensating surplus welfare measure, α is the marginal utility of income 
(represented by the coefficient of the monetary attribute β$ in the choice experiment) and 𝑉
0  and 𝑉1  
represent the value of the indirect utility functions before and after the change under consideration. 
Using the MWTP and CS estimates for the GRB and SRB, we calculate relative transfer errors (%) for 
transfers in both directions (i.e. GRB to SRB and vice versa) using the equation:  
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = |
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃/𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃/𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃/𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
|  × 100% (8) 
We adjust MWTP and CS estimates for the policy site by inserting observed values of socio-economic 
characteristics and perceptual variables into the utility function derived for the study site to derive 
estimates of Predicted MWTP/CSpolicy site. Absolute transfer errors (i.e., Estimated MWTP/CSstudy site – 
Estimated MWTP/CSpolicy site) and relative transfer errors are then compared for the MXL models in 
relation to the ECLC model to assess the impact of taking AN-A into account. 
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3. Data 
 
We employ data of DCEs collected from the population of the two Spanish river basins (GRB and 
SRB). Respondents were asked to select the most preferred alternative in a set of different scenarios 
of water allocation to the environment and frequencies of household water restrictions. Table 1 
presents the attributes and levels of the choice experiment - see Martin-Ortega et al. (2011) for details 
on the valuation scenario.  
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
The design comprises 24 choice cards organized in 6 blocks representing a fractional factorial design. 
Each respondent hence faced four choice occasions, in which they were asked to choose between the 
current situation with no rise in the water bill, and option A and B with different levels of 
improvement of the two attributes in exchange for an annual increase in the water bill. ¡Error! No se 
encuentra el origen de la referencia. shows an example of a typical choice card.  
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
The environmental attribute was coded as a set of dummy variables omitting the moderate level of 
environmental quality as the reference category in the models 4 , while the frequency of water 
restrictions was entered as a continuous variable taking values from 1 to 4 years with restrictions 
during summer within the next ten years. Apart from the choice experiment, the survey collected 
                                                            
4  The design does not allow estimation of the utility impact of a move from ‘poor’ to ‘moderate’ for 
environmental status related to river flows (ENV). Because the ‘poor’ level used to describe the status quo does 
not also appear in the remaining (designed) alternatives, it is not possible to estimate the difference in utility 
between ‘poor’ and ‘moderate’, which serves as the reference level (see section 2 for further details). This was 
done to serve the original purpose of the study, but it is unfortunate for the present paper. Strictly speaking, 
therefore, when we refer to non-attendance to ENV, this involves non-attendance to any improvement in ENV 
over ‘moderate’, since any choice of a non-status quo alternative implies a move from ‘poor’ to ‘moderate’. 
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information on basic socio-economic characteristics and respondents’ perceptions on and attitudes 
towards aspects related to water scarcity and the environment. 
The same questionnaire, with the same experimental design, was administered between June and 
September 2008 to two samples of the population of the GRB (354 respondents) and SRB (394 
respondents) derived from a quota-based sampling procedure with quotas based on age and sex, and 
an additional fixed sample size for respondents residing in either urban or rural areas. The surveys 
were designed by a joint team of researchers and applied simultaneously following the same survey 
protocol. The only difference in the survey process between the two sites concerned the enumerators. 
They were trained by the same team of researchers, but were residents of the respective regions where 
the survey was carried out.  
Preceding the survey, existing case study status reports were examined, and river basin experts were 
consulted in a series of scientific workshops in the original study. In addition, a series of focus groups 
with a total of about 30 people in each case study were organised to discuss the attributes. The main 
survey was preceded by three rounds of pre-testing and a small pilot study, involving approximately 
one hundred individuals. The pre-tests focused specifically on i) the refinement of attributes and 
levels; ii) the clarity and credibility of the policy scenarios and baseline conditions; and iii) the 
wording and understanding of survey questions. 
While being considerably different in size (the GRB being larger than the SRB), these two basins 
share common features relevant for the valuation scenario used, because they face similar challenges 
to the implementation of the WFD. In both river basins, the target of achieving good ecological status 
is compromised by structural water scarcity and competing demands for water use. Both have a 
Mediterranean climate with heterogeneous precipitation distribution. Agricultural abstraction is the 
most important consumptive water use in both cases (between 70 and 80%)5. Both regions have 
suffered from several periods of severe drought in the past 40 years, the latest occurring in 2004/5 in 
                                                            
5 The second and third largest consumptive water uses are in both cases domestic water supply and industrial 
abstraction and use. The relative magnitude of domestic water consumption is higher in the SRB (25%) 
compared to the GRB (11.5%). 
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the GRB (CHG, 2007) and in 2007 in the SRB (CHJ, 2007), resulting in restrictions in the agricultural 
and industrial use of water in both cases. Households in the GRB have also experienced water use 
restrictions due to limited water availability (CHG, 2007). 
In both basins, climate change is expected to result in lower water yield and more frequent drought 
events as a consequence of both a rise in temperatures and a reduction in rainfall. For 2030, 
simulations considering a temperature increase of 1◦C and a reduction of 5% in mean rainfall project a 
decrease of mean water yield of almost 12% in both river basins, which is above the national Spanish 
average of 8% (Iglesias et al. 2005). Overall, the similarities between both river basins in terms of 
environmental challenges and ecological site characteristics make this a typical example where a 
benefit transfer between sites may be considered to be appropriate. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of socio-economic and perceptual variables elicited in the survey. 
In terms of representativeness, the samples generally compare favourably to population statistics of 
the two regions. Some notable differences are a higher share of upper secondary education in the 
samples (statistically significant for SRB), greater household size and slight differences in household 
income (statistically significant for both regions), while the samples match age and gender 
distributions of the population very well.  
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
With regards to perceptual variables relevant to the valuation context, all variables are significantly 
different across the two sites, with a higher percentage of the GRB sample reporting past experience 
with water use restrictions, and a greater tendency of the GRB sample respondents to perceive water 
scarcity as problem, to believe that scenarios of future water scarcity are credible, and to consider the 
environment a priority when allocating water in case of scarcity (relative to agriculture and industry). 
The average annual water bill as recalled by respondents, on the other hand, is higher in the SRB. 
Several socio-economic and perceptual/attitudinal variables are included in the utility function and 
thus form the basis for a benefit function transfer. Age, income, gender, the belief that water scarcity 
is a problem in the region and a subjective assessment of whether it is credible that there will be a 
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future increase in water scarcity are interacted with the ASC. In the WTP space models, income is 
interacted with the environmental attributes (RES, ENV), while income is interacted with COST in 
the ECLC models. Additionally, the effect of whether a respondent has suffered from water scarcity 
conditions in the past on preferences for reducing the frequency of household water restrictions 
(RES), and the effect of considering the environment as a priority for allocating water in case of 
scarcity on preferences for ecological status improvements are added to the utility function.  
Protest answers were distinguished from legitimate zero bids by means of follow up questions about 
the reasons why respondents were not willing to pay. Less than 5% of the responses were classified as 
‘protesters’ and were excluded from the analysis of the choice data6, following standard procedure in 
stated preferences literature (Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn, 2007). 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 3 reports the model results for the GRB and SRB sites. In all models, all environmental 
attributes effects carrythe expected sign after considering the interaction terms with socio-economic 
and perceptual variables. That is, a one year increase in the frequency of water use restrictions in the 
next ten years (RES) is on average associated with a utility loss, while improvements in the ecological 
status related to river water flow relative to ‘moderate’ (ENV2 for improvement to good, and ENV3 
for improvement to very good) are associated with a utility gain. The monetary attribute (COST) is 
negative, implying that respondents are price sensitive TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
Several of the interaction terms between attributes and socio-economic and perceptual covariates are 
statistically significant. The interaction term of the cost attribute with income is positive for the ECLC 
models, indicating that wealthier respondents are less sensitive to increases in the water bill, but the 
coefficient is only significant for the SRB sample. In the WTP space MXL models for both regions, 
income has a positive effect on MWTP for reducing the frequency of water use restrictions (RES) and 
                                                            
6 The omission of protest responses has no effect on the model results and the conclusions drawn in this paper.  
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for improving the ecological status of the rivers (ENV). Suffering from water scarcity conditions in 
the past impacts positively on MWTP to reduce the frequency of water use restrictions in the GRB 
sample. This effect is, however, only significantly different from zero in the MXL model. The same 
effect is negative but not significantly different from zero for the SRB for both MXL and ECLC 
models. Considering the environment as a priority for allocating water impacts positively on MWTP 
for improving ecological status, and is significant for improvements to both good (ENV2) and very 
good (ENV3) levels in the MXL model for SRB, and significant for ENV3 and the SRB in the ECLC 
model. Several of the interaction terms with the ASC are significant, but both sign and level of 
statistical significance differ markedly between models and regions. 
The MXL models for both GRB and SRB exhibit significant random taste heterogeneity. The 
inclusion of random parameters in the MXL models significantly improved model fit in terms of log-
likelihood compared to the CL models, especially for the SRB sample. For both sites, and consistently 
with previous findings in the literature (see Hensher et al. 2012 and articles cited therein), model fit 
improves significantly when considering AN-A behaviour using the ECLC compared to MXL 
models7. This can be interpreted as an indication of the presence of AN-A in the data (Scarpa et al. 
2009). Across all three types of models, MWTP of improving the ecological status related to water 
flow (ENV) is increasing for increasing levels of improvement (i.e. MWTPENV3 > MWTPENV2), 
showing respondent’s sensitivity to scope as theoretically expected (Carson 1997). 
Table 4 shows the non-attendance patterns as inferred by the ECLC models for the GRB and SRB 
data. Generally, the probability of AN-A is considerable for both data sets, but within the range of 
AN-A probabilities reported in the literature (e.g., Scarpa et al. 2009). While AN-A to the frequency 
of water use restrictions (RES) is of similar magnitude (+/- 60%) in the GRB and SRB data, inferred 
non-attendance to improvements in ecological status (ENV2 and ENV3) is more pronounced in the 
                                                            
7 Test statistics of a BenAkiva and Swait (1986) test are ~0, i.e. the probability of erroneously choosing MXL as 
the true model when the ECLC is the true model is effectively zero for both GRB and SRB. For convenience the 
reader may also wish to compare values of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) listed in Table 3. 
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GRB sample (66%) than in the SRB sample (45%). Non-attendance to increases in the water bill 
(COST), as inferred by the ECLC, is at 58% more than twice as high for the SRB model compared to 
the GRB model. Given that MWTP is estimated as the ratio of the marginal utility of non-cost 
attributes and the marginal utility of cost (or income minus cost, to be precise), we would, ceteris 
paribus, expect AN-A to cost to result in an upward bias if not considered by the modelling approach, 
and AN-A to environmental attributes to result in a downward bias. Given the AN-A patterns for GRB 
and SRB found here, we would therefore expect that, relative to each other, MWTP was downward 
biased in the MXL model of the GRB data, while MWTP as derived from the MXL model is biased 
upwards for the SRB data.  
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
This can be confirmed by inspecting the MWTP estimates reported in Table 5. MXL-based MWTP 
estimates are between three to eight times higher for the SRB than for the GRB. CS estimates based 
on MXL results are about five times larger for the SRB compared to the GRB8, as shown in Table 6.  
MWTP estimates derived from ECLC models are considerably lower for the SRB. Comparing the 
ECLC MWTP estimates of the SRB sample with those derived from the GRB data, it becomes 
apparent that as a result of accounting for AN-A, mean MWTP for all attributes is higher in 
magnitude for the GRB, reversing the findings based on the MXL models. Mean CS estimates based 
on ECLC models are, however, still higher in magnitude for the SRB9. The impact of adjusting for 
differences in socio-economic and perceptual covariates is relatively modest for both MXL and ECLC 
models. 
TABLES 5 AND 6 AROUND HERE 
                                                            
8 The applied tests (Poe et al. 2005) confirm that differences in MWTP and CS are statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
9 Based on results of Poe et al. (2005) tests, the null hypothesis that mean MWTP distributions of RES, ENV2 
and ENV3 are equal for samples can only be rejected for RES, but the null hypothesis of equal CS distributions 
cannot be rejected for any of the six CS estimates. 
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Of key interest in a benefit transfer context testing for convergent validity are estimates of relative and 
absolute transfer errors in both directions, i.e. considering the GRB as the policy site and the SRB as 
the study site and vice versa, shown in Table 7. Relative transfer errors when using MWTP and CS 
estimates derived from MXL models are between 69% and 87% if values are transferred from GRB to 
SRB, and >300% (MXL) for the majority of MWTP and CS estimates if the transfer is conducted in 
the opposite direction (SRB to GRB). Relative transfer errors derived from the ECLC models are 
considerably lower in all cases for a transfer from SRB to GRB. This also applies to the reverse 
transfer from GRB to SRB with the exception of RES, which has a slightly larger relative transfer 
error. Considering absolute differences in MWTP and CS, all estimates based on the ECLC models 
are much lower compared to estimates derived from MXL models.  
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
We have found that, for our case studies, transfer errors based on mixed logit (MXL) choice models 
are considerable, both in relative and absolute terms. While being large, relative transfer errors of the 
order of magnitude of 100% or even several hundreds per cent are not unusual and have been reported 
in the literature. For example, Loomis et al. (1995) find transfer errors of up to 475% in multi-site lake 
recreation; Van den Berg et al. (2001) report relative transfer errors of 239% for groundwater quality 
improvements; Morrison and Bennett (2000) estimate relative transfer errors of 191% in a case study 
on wetland valuation; Colombo et al. (2008) find transfer errors based on compensating surplus (CS) 
estimates of changes in landscape attributes to range between 25% and 2,234%; Bateman et al. (2011) 
report transfer errors ranging from 37 to 137% for international water quality transfers. Beyond the 
magnitude of transfer errors estimated from MXL models, however, we find that it is not 
straightforward to relate differences in both marginal and total willingness to pay (WTP) estimates to 
observed differences between the sites. Mean marginal WTP (MWTP) estimates per household are 
significantly lower for the Guadalquivir River Basin (GRB), while its population expressed a 
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significantly higher concern for current and future developments related to water scarcity and the 
environmental impacts of reduced water flows in rivers. Additionally, key socio-economic drivers that 
have been applied in functional benefit transfer such as income do not markedly differ between both 
sites – mean income is even slightly but statistically significantly lower in the Serpis River Basin 
(SRB) sample. Given the assumption of equality of underlying preferences in convergent validity 
tests, these results would suggest the existence of unobserved factors that have a large impact on 
MWTP. A reduction of the frequency of water use restrictions by three years out of ten and an 
improvement of ecological status related to water flow from moderate to very good would be valued 
at 144% (MXL) of the average annual water bill in the SRB. When faced with such benefit estimates, 
some analysts and policy makers may therefore not consider them of a realistic magnitude. Scarpa et 
al. (2009) make a similar observation regarding WTP estimates derived from a conditional logit 
model valuing landscape attributes in Ireland.  
In this paper, we have explored an alternative approach to address this clearly unsatisfactory situation. 
We test if accounting for heterogeneity in attribute processing – and attribute non-attendance (AN-A) 
in particular – can help to improve the convergent validity of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) 
collected at two different sites. We infer AN-A behaviour analytically using an equality-constrained 
latent class (ECLC) model. Results show that the large transfer errors across the two sites are partly 
due to the existence of non-attendance patterns that are dissimilar across the two sites. After 
accounting for AN-A behaviour using an ECLC model, both absolute and relative transfer errors are 
significantly reduced.  
The results of this study suggest that econometric specification errors impact on conclusions drawn 
from convergent validity tests in benefit transfer. This insight has received little attention compared to 
the ongoing search for ways to reduce the generalisation error, for example by introducing new sets of 
explanatory variables for use in transfers of preference functions (e.g., Norton et al. 2012). As 
demonstrated in this paper, the consequences of ignoring differences in respondent behaviour to stated 
choice tasks across different sites may result in erroneous assessments of convergent validity. AN-A 
may not be the only source of error arising from the data collection and analysis process. This casts 
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doubt on the use of convergent validity tests as the ‘workhorse’ to developing benefit transfer 
guidelines for stated preference data. At worst, the presence of an econometric specification error 
implies that such tests provide only random results that, in addition to publication bias towards studies 
that demonstrate methodological innovations and other concerns about convergent validity tests 
themselves (Kaul et al. 2013), are of little use for improving our understanding of when benefit 
transfer actually works. However, we do not believe that the situation is as extreme: as a recent review 
by Kaul et al. (2013) demonstrates, some generally applicable conclusions can be drawn from about 
two decades of convergent validity testing. The same authors suggest that there is a need to 
investigate why some value comparisons across sites have small and others have large errors. In this 
respect the findings of this paper could motivate a re-assessment of convergent validity tests after 
taking AN-A behaviour into account in the modelling process, especially in cases where transfer 
errors have been reported to be large. Ultimately, this could contribute to the development of reliable 
guidance criteria for benefit transfer. 
Before concluding, we critically reflect on the methodological approach that we have employed. The 
reasons underlying AN-A behaviour are generally difficult to disentangle, and possibly not fully 
identifiable by the researcher, although first attempts have been made (Alemu et al. 2013). The body 
of empirical evidence suggests that individuals use a number of different information processing 
strategies when completing a series of stated choice tasks. These strategies may reflect actual 
preferences or various decision heuristics (Hensher and Greene 2009) related to choice task 
complexity and the experimental design (Puckett and Hensher 2008; Hensher et al. 2012), including 
differential allocation of attention across attributes depending upon both the expected marginal 
benefits and marginal costs of further information processing (Cameron and De Shazo 2011). 
In the case study presented here, only the enumerators differed in the approach to collecting data from 
the two case study sites. While the study was carefully administered in both river basins, including an 
extensive training of enumerators, we cannot deny the possibility that interviewer effects affected the 
differences in AN-A patterns across sites. However, the reasons for these differences may also be 
related to differences in attention to the survey instrument, or intrinsic social and cultural differences 
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between the populations of the two sites, which are very difficult, if not impossible, to predict a 
priori. All of these issues apply to most stated preference studies conducted across different regions. 
Regarding the modelling procedure, different approaches to account for AN-A in stated choice 
modelling either based on analytical approaches (e.g., Scarpa et al. 2009; Hensher et al. 2012) or 
based on respondents stated behaviour (Hensher et al. 2005; Campbell et al. 2008; Scarpa et al. 2010) 
have been explored in the literature. The ability of the different approaches to reliably assess AN-A 
may be questioned (Alemu et al. 2013; Scarpa et al. 2013), but the collective body of evidence 
suggests that AN-A is a real phenomenon (Hensher et al. 2012) with potentially severe implications 
on key behavioural interpretations of results. The ECLC approach to inferring AN-A behaviour taken 
in this paper does not allow for preference heterogeneity to be considered, while Campbell et al. 
(2012) and Hess et al (2013) suggest that it can be important. Generally, it is very difficult to 
disentangle AN-A and preference heterogeneity, in particular low sensitivity to changes in attributes, 
analytically in the model structure. However, in the context of benefit transfer based on DCEs, the use 
of a combined latent class-mixed logit model or the stochastic attribute selection approach (STAS) 
described in Scarpa et al. (2009) certainly deserves further investigation.  
Our study was presented as a benefit function transfer, adjusting for differences in socio-economic 
characteristics and perceptual variables between sites. We acknowledge that the choice of covariates 
and their inclusion into the utility function can affect the magnitude of transfer errors to some degree. 
We tested several specifications and sets of covariates, which in our case did not significantly affect 
the general results. Beyond applications of benefit function transfer using discrete choice experiments, 
the impact of the econometric specification error related to considering information processing on 
WTP values derived via meta-analysis also deserves further investigation. 
We included ASCs for the estimation of CS. There are arguments both for and against their inclusion. 
ASCs may represent protest motives (status quo bias) or yeah-saying behaviour. In a choice 
experiment setting with two or more policy alternatives and a status quo, naïve yeah-saying would 
imply choosing randomly from the two policy alternatives while consistently ignoring the status quo 
alternative. Ignoring the status quo alternative may, however, be a decision that reflects genuine 
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preferences for environmental quality improvements not captured by the attributes that should be 
accounted for in welfare estimation. That is, if a respondent decides to choose only from the policy 
alternatives, and is considering at least cost to arrive at her/his final choice, it can be argued that 
ASCs should be included. In contrast to the ECLC models that incorporate AN-A behaviour, the 
MXL models do not allow this distinction, and the resulting contribution of the ASCs to the CS 
estimates is particularly large, especially for the SRB sample. The CS estimates based on the MXL 
models should therefore be treated with caution. Finally, if ASCs are included, it is implicitly 
assumed that the two river basins do not differ in unobserved aspects (i.e., in aspects that are not 
covered by the attributes that are related to water scarcity and ecological status). If this is the case, 
Morrison et al. (2002) suggest that it may be prudent to only use MWTP estimates for benefit transfer. 
While the two river basins share similar characteristics regarding the challenges they face, we cannot 
deny the possibility that unobserved differences between sites may exist, for example related to 
differences in patterns of water use by the respective populations. Irrespective of the above issues, our 
main finding that econometric specification error related to AN-A behaviour can matter in function 
benefit transfer based on discrete choice experiments is not affected by whether or not we include 
ASCs for welfare estimation. 
The policy implications of not accounting for the econometric specification error due to AN-A in 
benefit transfer based on DCEs clearly depend on the valuation context and the magnitude of the bias 
in WTP estimates, and are therefore case study specific. Generally, if biased WTP estimates enter a 
cost-benefit analysis, this can have important consequences on the economic efficiency of the related 
policy decision. The study presented in this paper is relevant to the policy context of the WFD. A 
WFD-specific element is the possibility of justifying derogation of investments aimed at improving 
the ecological status of water bodies based on economic grounds. In particular, the WFD provides 
Member States with the option to derogate investments based on an assessment of disproportionality 
of costs. Such an assessment requires the comparison of marginal costs and benefits of water status 
improvements across all river basins within a relatively short period of time (Martin-Ortega 2012). 
Benefit transfer using information from a limited number of existing primary valuation studies is 
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expected to play a key role in this analysis. Large transfer errors on the assessment of benefits could 
lead to decisions reflecting inefficient resource allocation (i.e. justifying derogations when the 
benefits actually exceed costs, or supporting interventions that would actually be disproportionately 
costly). In our study, a transfer based on the MXL model results in statistically significantly different 
WTP estimates at the policy sites. Once AN-A is taken into account, differences in both MWTP and 
CS between the two river basins are considerably reduced. Therefore, econometric specification error 
related to differences in AN-A behaviour between the two river basins may significantly affect 
outcomes of analyses of disproportionality of public investments in water quality improvements. 
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Figure 1. Example of a typical choice card 
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Table 1. Description of the choice experiment attributes and levels 
Attributes Description 
Attribute 1: Levels of ecological status related to water flow (ENV) 
Poor (baseline) This is the expected future situation of low water levels 
and environmental quality status. It entails a large 
deviation from the natural situation due to the increased 
water scarcity conditions. Many fish species will disappear 
and riverbanks will lose most of their vegetation. As a 
result most birds and insects will disappear as well. 
Moderate  Less than natural water levels and environmental quality 
status. This is still a substantial deviation from the natural 
situation. A limited number of fish species are present. 
Riverbanks have some vegetation supporting a limited 
number and variety of birds and other wildlife. 
Good  Water levels and environmental quality status are close to 
their natural levels. There is a small deviation from the 
natural situation. Under these conditions riverbanks have a 
lower than natural vegetation cover. As a result the 
breeding and nesting conditions for a number of species 
are limited. 
Very good  Water levels and the environmental quality status are at 
their natural state where there is almost no pressure from 
human activities. Conditions for wildlife are optimal under 
these circumstances. 
Attribute 2: Frequency of household water restrictions (RES) 
Restrictions in 4 out of the next 10 years (baseline) Restrictions on watering gardens, filling swimming pools, 
using washing machines and other ‘secondary water uses’. 
Water shortfall lasting 6 to 7 hours during up to 20 days in 
dry summers. 
Restrictions in 3 out of the next 10 years 
Restrictions in 2 out of the next 10 years 
Restrictions in 1 out of the next 10 years 
Monetary attribute (COST) Increase in the household water bill of 0 (baseline) 20, 40, 
60, 80, 100 and 120 euros per year during the next 10 
years 
 
  
31 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of case study descriptive variables 
 
GRB  SRB  
Variable 
Sample Target 
Population 
p-value 
Sample vs 
Target population 
 Sample Target 
Population 
p-value 
Sample vs 
Target population 
GRB vs SRB 
p-value 
 
Socio-economic characteristics         
Age groups (%) 
18-34 years 
35-59 years 
60 or more years 
31.4 
51.1 
17.5 
32.5 
48.8 
18.7 
0.95 
 
30.5 
44.9 
24.6 
30.3 
44.8 
25.0 
1 0.095 
Age (mean) 43.6 - -  46.2 - - < 0.01** 
Gender (male=0; female=1) 0.5 0.5 0.88  0.5 0.5 0.88 0.83 
Education (%)   
0.067 
   
<0.01a 0.95 
No studies  12.7 17.1  13.5 36.8 
Secondary studies 58.7 69.9  62.1 51.7 
Upper Secondary studies 25.7 13.0  24.4 11.5 
Household size 3.5 2.8 0.051  3.0 2.7 0.68 < 0.01** 
Annual household income (10k €) 2.3 2.1 < 0.01a  2.2 2.5 < 0.01a < 0.01** 
Recalled Annual water bill (€) 168 - -  213 - - < 0.05** 
Perceptual variables         
Water scarcity is a problem in the region (0=not a 
problem at all; 4=a big problem) 
3.1 - - 
 
2.5 - - < 0.01** 
Respondent has suffered from water use restrictions in 
the past (1=yes;0=no) 
0.6 - - 
 
0.2 - - < 0.01** 
Environment should have priority when allocating 
water in case of scarcity (after households) 
(1=yes;0=no) 
0.4 - - 
 
0.3 - - < 0.01** 
It is credible that water scarcity in the region will 
increase (0=not credible at all; 4=totally credible) 
2.8 - - 
 
2.3 - - < 0.01a** 
Note: Variables in italics are included in the utility function of the choice models; Reported summary statistics are mean values; a Sample is not representative with respect to 
characteristic based on a Chi-square test at the 5% significance level; ** Statistically significant differences between SRB sample and GRB sample at the 5% significance 
level following a Chi-square test 
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Table 3. Model results 
 CL GRB CL SRB MXL GRBa MXL SRBa ECLCM GRB ECLCM SRB 
RES 
-0.118 
(0.065) 
* -0.448 
(0.047) 
*** -0.024 
(0.034) 
 -0.108 
(0.008) 
*** -1.673 
(0.366) 
*** -1.857 
(0.276) 
*** 
RES_suffered 
-0.087 
(0.057) 
 0.176 
(0.067) 
*** -0.023 
(0.01) 
** 0.004 
(0.007) 
 -0.386 
(0.229) 
 0.135 
(0.298) 
 
RES_income 
-  -  -0.010 
(0.01) 
 -0.027 
(0.004) 
*** -  -  
ENV2 
0.115 
(0.126) 
 0.673 
(0.107) 
*** -0.025 
(0.054) 
 0.277 
(0.027) 
*** 3.925 
(0.826) 
*** 3.227 
(0.481) 
*** 
ENV2_priority 
0.482 
(0.161) 
*** 0.513 
(0.157) 
*** 0.029 
(0.025) 
 0.126 
(0.019) 
*** 0.565 
(0.655) 
 0.417 
(0.468) 
 
ENV2_income 
-  -  0.04 
(0.023) 
* 0.07 
(0.008) 
*** -  -  
ENV3 
0.381 
(0.136) 
*** 1.063 
(0.113) 
*** -0.122 
(0.076) 
 0.378 
(0.033) 
*** 5.513 
(0.945) 
*** 5.641 
(0.819) 
*** 
ENV3_priority 
0.172 
(0.175) 
 0.962 
(0.161) 
*** 0.01 
(0.037) 
 0.374 
(0.033) 
*** 0.331 
(0.841) 
 1.354 
(0.700) 
* 
ENV3_income 
-  -  0.103 
(0.031) 
*** 0.116 
(0.010) 
*** -  -  
COST 
-0.042 
(0.007) 
*** -0.016 
(0.004) 
*** -2.19 
(0.115) 
*** 2.02 
(0.175) 
*** -0.138 
(0.022) 
*** -0.246 
(0.032) 
*** 
COST_income 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
   -  0.006 
(0.008) 
 0.03 
(0.008) 
*** 
ASC 
-1.422 
(0.665) 
** 2.093 
(0.433) 
*** -0.452 
(0.102) 
*** -1.82 
(0.113) 
*** -  -  
ASC_ageb 
0.013 
(0.047) 
 0.037 
(0.042) 
 -0.003 
(0.009) 
 0.293 
(0.015) 
*** -0.093 
(0.099) 
 -0.126 
(0.230) 
 
ASC_income 
0.034 
(0.216) 
 -0.338 
(0.125) 
*** 0.074 
(0.03) 
*** -0.225 
(0.026) 
*** 0.340 
(0.397) 
 -0.916 
(0.429) 
** 
ASC_gender 
-0.119 
(0.125) 
 0.059 
(0.137) 
 -0.053 
(0.025) 
** 0.764 
(0.050) 
*** -0.157 
(0.279) 
 2.390 
(0.834) 
*** 
ASC_scarcity 
-0.052 
(0.058) 
 -0.318 
(0.054) 
*** 0.014 
(0.01) 
 -0.412 
(0.025) 
*** 0.045 
(0.125) 
 -4.228 
(0.637) 
*** 
ASC_credible 
-0.077 
(0.113) 
 -0.398 
(0.062) 
*** 0.032 
(0.017) 
* 0.003 
(0.017) 
 -0.386 
(0.229) 
* -3.298 
(0.532) 
*** 
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Table 3 ctd. Model results 
 CL GRB CL SRB MXL GRB
a
 MXL SRB
a
 ECLCM GRB ECLCM SRB 
ASC class 1 
-  -  -  -  7.721 
(1.939) 
*** 1.286 
(2.468) 
 
ASC class 2 
-  -  -  -  -1.945 
(1.601) 
 -19.614 
(6.986) 
*** 
ASC class 3 
-  -  -  -  -3.472 
(1.673) 
** 13.504 
(3.087) 
*** 
ASC class 4 
-  -  -  -  3.116 
(5.158) 
 5.786 
(6.875) 
 
ASC class 5 
-  -  -  -  -5.391 
(1.388) 
*** 24.555 
(4.177) 
*** 
ASC class 6 
-  -  -  -  -0.973 
(4.887) 
 12.916 
(2.970) 
*** 
ASC class 7 
-  -  -  -  6.034 
(3.556) 
* 5.328 
(4.479) 
 
ASC class 8 
-  -  -  -  -0.689 
(1.231) 
 11.394 
(2.486) 
*** 
ASC class 9c -  -  -  -  0  0  
RES STDV 
-  -  0.023 
(0.007) 
*** 0.159 
(0.007) 
*** - 
 
- 
 
ENV2 STDV 
-  -  0.076 
(0.018) 
*** 0.177 
(0.013) 
*** - 
 
- 
 
ENV3 STDV 
-  -  0.105 
(0.026) 
*** 0.06 
(0.010) 
*** - 
 
- 
 
COST STDV 
-  -  1.32 
(0.193) 
*** 2.54 
(0.205) 
*** - 
 
- 
 
σA,B
d 
    2.38 
(0.283) 
*** 11.3 
(1.90) 
***  
 
 
 
LL -1219.8 -1387.0 -1096.1 -985.5 -1069.7 -928.7 
Observations 1348 1544 1348 1544 1348 1544 
AIC 2467.6 2802.0 2234.2 2013.0 2197.4 1915.4 
BIC 2483.4 2818.6 2257.9 2038 2230.2 1949.9 
Adjusted 
Pseudo R2 
0.17 0.17 0.25 0.41 0.26 0.44 
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Note: a Cost scaled by 1/100 (multiply by 100 to arrive at WTP in €); b Age scaled by 1/10; c The ASC is constrained to be equal to zero in 
class 9; d variance of the additional error component shared between alternatives A and B; MXL models estimated using 2,000 Halton draws; 
*,**,*** statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
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Table 4. Attribute Non-Attendance  patterns in the Guadalquivir River Basin ( GRB) and 
Serpis River Basin (SRB) data based on equality constraint latent class (ECLC ) model 
results 
GRB       
  
 Attendance pattern specified in ECLC 
modela 
 
Class 
membership 
probability GRB 
Class 
membership 
probability SRB RES ENV2 ENV3 COST 
Class 1 0.102 0.056 1 1 1 1 
Class 2 0.178 0.143 0 1 1 1 
Class 3 0.253 0.097 1 0 0 1 
Class 4 0.016 0.21 1 1 1 0 
Class 5 0.221 0.129 0 0 0 1 
Class 6 0.043 0.147 0 1 1 0 
Class 7 0.002 0.087 1 0 0 0 
Class 8 0.18 0.114 0 0 0 0 
Class 9b 0.008 0.017 0 0 0 0 
Probability of non-
attendance GRB  
 0.628 0.660 0.660 0.246 
Probability of non-
attendance SRB  
 0.55 0.445 0.445 0.575 
Note: aAttendance (1=attended; 0 = not attended); b As opposed to class 8, class 9 restricts the ASC to be 
zero, reflecting random choice among all three alternatives 
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Table 5. Mean marginal willingness to pay estimates  
  At mean of covariates of study site    At mean of covariates of policy 
site (Function transfer) 
 
 MXL GRB MXL SRB ECLCM GRB ECLCM SRB  MXL GRB MXL SRB ECLCM GRB ECLCM SRB 
RESa 
6.00 
(4.39;7.67) 
16.47 
(15.23;17.82) 
7.14 
(4.83;9.42) 
3.66 
(2.83;4.62) 
 5.10 
(3.23;6.95) 
16.49 
(15.20;17.81) 
6.61 
(4.37;8.8) 
3.59 
(2.81;4.48) 
ENV2b 
7.79 
(4.79;10.76) 
47.36 
(44.09;50.72) 
12.63 
(7.71;17.70) 
8.69 
(7.45;10.04) 
 7.28 
(4.25;10.28) 
48.88 
(45.57;52.21) 
12.44 
(7.56;17.41) 
8.88 
(7.62;10.25) 
ENV3b 
11.45 
(7.18;15.76) 
76.16 
(71.13;81.08) 
17.06 
(11.45;22.79) 
15.72 
(13.72;17.76) 
 10.70 
(6.32;15.15) 
80.09 
(75.07;85.13) 
16.92 
(11.55;22.46) 
16.19 
(14.2;18.27) 
Note: all values in € per household and year; 95% confidence bounds for mean marginal WTP estimates reported in parentheses were derived using the Krinsky and Robb 
(1986) method with 2,000 draws; aRES: Marginal WTP for a reduction of the frequency of water use restrictions of one year out of ten; bENV: marginal WTP for an 
improvement in environmental quality to good (ENV2) and very good (ENV3) status 
 
Table 6. Compensating surplus estimates  
 Change in frequency 
of water use 
restrictionsa 
Change in 
environmental quality 
of water bodiesb 
Compensating surplusc 
 
 RES ENV MXL GRB MXL SRB ECLCM GRB ECLCM SRB 
Scenario 1 -1 good 
54.33 
(49.48;59.03) 
249.82 
(175.69;322.2) 
35.18 
(31.92;38.52) 
59.62 
(48.17;71.56) 
Scenario 2 -1 very good 
55.55 
(50.45;60.86) 
274.93 
(201.58;346.88) 
39.65 
(36.22;43.10) 
66.94 
(55.28;79.02) 
Scenario 3 -2 good 
58 
(53.37;62.44) 
265.56 
(190.22;338.36) 
41.79 
(38.13;45.51) 
63.22 
(51.77;75.38) 
Scenario 4 -2 very good 
59.22 
(54;64.45) 
290.66 
(216.58;363.88) 
46.26 
(42.55;50.13) 
70.53 
(58.78;82.76) 
Scenario 5 -3 good 
61.67 
(56.44;66.94) 
281.3 
(205.3;355.35) 
48.4 
(43.18;53.58) 
66.81 
(55.29;79.12) 
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Scenario 6 -3 very good 
62.89 
(56.95;68.49) 
306.4 
(232.37;380.83) 
52.87 
(47.77;58.13) 
74.12 
(62.34;86.54) 
Note: a number of years out of ten (baseline: four years); b baseline level: poor; c € per household and year; 95% confidence bounds for WTP estimates reported in parentheses 
were derived using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) method with 2,000 draws 
Table 7. Mean transfer errors 
 MXL ECLCM 
 GRB  SRB SRB  GRB GRB  SRB SRB  GRB 
Absolute transfer errors (€)a 
   
RES -11.39 11.39 3.01 -3.01 
ENV2 -41.60 41.60 3.57 -3.57 
ENV3 -69.39 69.39 0.73 -0.73 
Scenario 1 -182.69 182.69 -24.44 24.44 
Scenario 2 -210.48 210.48 -27.28 27.28 
Scenario 3 -194.08 194.08 -21.43 21.43 
Scenario 4 -221.86 221.86 -24.27 24.27 
Scenario 5 -205.46 205.46 -18.42 18.42 
Scenario 6 -233.25 233.25 -21.26 21.26 
Relative transfer errors (%)b 
   
RES 69.23 232.86 82.57 44.98 
ENV2 85.19 602.65 39.39 27.25 
ENV3 86.72 682.37 9.03 8.68 
Scenario 1 78.81 373.17 40.40 69.90 
Scenario 2 80.03 402.26 40.31 69.06 
Scenario 3 78.16 358.85 33.37 51.50 
Scenario 4 79.38 386.26 34.01 52.57 
Scenario 5 77.59 347.26 27.09 38.29 
Scenario 6 78.80 373.10 28.32 40.35 
Note: GRB SRB indicates transfers from the GRB (study site) to the SRB (policy site); 
SRBGRB indicates transfers from the SRB (study site) to the GRB (policy site) 
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